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COMES NOW Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion Gal of 
Ogden, (Fashion Centre), by and through its attorney, Theodore E. 
Kanell, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court and hereby moves this Court for a rehearing. 
This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the 
attached Memorandum including Law and Facts which Petitioner 
claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended. 
The undersigned counsel for Petitioner hereby certifies 
that the Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of April , 
1989. HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Fashion Centre Ltd. 
dba Fashion Gal of Ogden 
(Fashion Centre) 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
The following Memorandum of Points and Authorities is 
submitted in support of Fashion Centre's Petition for Rehearing. 
ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Fashion Centre respectfully submits that the Supreme 
Court has overlooked or misapprehended ci number of critical 
issues in reversing and remanding this case for a new trial on a 
theory of breach of an implied term of the employment contract. 
The issues are as follows: 
1. Is it appropriate for this Court to reverse and 
remand this case for a new trial on the theory of breach of an 
implied-in-fact term of the employment contract when Plaintiff 
presented evidence on the issue, did not object to the law as 
stated to the jury, and neither preserved nor raised this issue 
on appeal. In fact, Plaintiff conceded on appeal and at all 
times during trial that she was "an at-will employee" terminable 
at the will of either party, trying to assert a new cause of 
action for "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing". 
2. Is Section IV of the opinion, "Propriety of 
Review," appropriate when all three grounds raised by the 
Plaintiff on appeal are denied by the majority of this Court? 
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Zimmerman logically support this Court's denial of such a cause 
of action. 
The trial court below repeatedly informed Plaintiff's 
counsel that such a cause of action was unavailable and that the 
only cause of action that could be submitted to the jury would be 
whether the express provisions of the written policy manual 
limited the employer's ability to terminate Plaintiff. 
(Appellant's Brief, Page 29). Even after the court correctly 
directed the Plaintiff as to the cause of action she should 
pursue, Plaintiff's counsel continued to demand a specific tort 
claim for breach of "the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing." 
The Plaintiff in her brief has previously acknowledged 
that the issue that went to the jury is the same issue which 
this Court now determines should again go to the jury. At page 
28 of her brief, Plaintiff states: 
However, in submitting the case to the jury 
on the four special interrogatories, the two 
issues which Judge Hyde ruled were to go to 
the jury were not preserved. The issue of 
whether or not the employment personnel 
policies and procedures created an express 
limitation upon the at-will employment 
relationship was preserved; however, the 
other issue which Judge Hyde identified, 
i.e.,. whether or not the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing was violated at 
the time of discharge, was not 
preserved The trial court, however, 
instructed Plaintiff's counsel that the trial 
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court interpreted Judge Hyde's ruling 
differently. The trial court had already 
determined that only one theory (whether the 
express provisions of the written policy 
procedures became a limitation on the 
employer's ability to terminate Plaintiff) 
would go the jury* 
Appellant's Brief, pp.28-29 (emphasis added). 
Reversing and remanding this case for a new trial on 
that issue is inappropriate: 
1. Plaintiff did not object to any of the jury 
instructions submitted on the issue, and she did not raise the 
issue in this appeal. In fact, Plaintiff after realizing the 
cause of action based upon breach of the "covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing" would not be submitted to the jury, half-
heartedly submitted and argued the case with respect to the 
breach of an implied term of the employment contract. 
2. In her Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff totally 
abandoned the claim based upon breach of an implied term of the 
employment contract by conceding that she was an at-will 
employee. (See page 27 of Appellant's Brief; see, also R.449 
Motion for New Trial). 
Justice Zimmerman, at page 28 of the slip opinion 
statedJ 
Because the at-will doctrine is only a 
presumption, the presumption can be rebutted 
by demonstrating that the parties did not 
intend the arrangement to be at will. In 
this context, the representations made by the 
employer in employee manuals, bulletins, and 
the like are legitimate sources for 
determining the apparent intention of the 
parties. 
In this particular case, the at-will doctrine is more 
than a mere presumption. The Plaintiff's concession that she 
was an at-will employee is determinative of the intent of the 
parties. No evidence exists which indicates that either party 
intended anything other than a contract of employment terminable 
at will by either party. 
3. Plaintiff further testified (R.80, Berube Depo., P. 
34t 57 and 58 and R.714) that she knew she would be terminated in 
accordance with express policy when she refused to take the third 
polygraph test. The intent of the parties was uncontradicted on 
this issue. Plaintiff knew that the jury could not find for her 
on the implied-in-fact exception based upon her own testimony. 
In fact, the jury determined correctly that Plaintiff did not 
have a cause of action for wrongful discharge on this theory. 
POINT II 
THE "PROPRIETY OF REVIEW REASONING PRESENTED BY THIS COURT 
DOES NOT LOGICALLY FOLLOW WHEN THE MAJORITY DID NOT 
ALLOW THE APPEAL ON ANY OF THE GROUNDS RAISED BY 
APPELLANT. 
This Court in the first paragraph of the slip opinion 
correctly stated the Plaintiff's claims on cippeal as follows: 
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Plaintiff Shirley Berube claims on appeal 
that the lower court erred in denying her 
motion to amend her complaint to add a cause 
of action based on Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 34-37-16(2), in granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Western 
States Polygraph, and in refusing to allow 
the jury to evaluate plaintiff's case based 
upon an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
This Court opines in Section IV of the opinion: 
Due to the dynamic state of this area of the 
law and the questionable foundations upon 
which the at-will doctrine rests, we will 
examine plaintiff's arguments in the interest 
of justice. Utah R.Civ.P. 51. This is an 
unusual case were the plaintiff seeks to 
alter the boundaries of the law. The trial 
court was aware of Plaintiff's intent and 
based its ruling on existing law. However, 
because of plaintiff's uncommon request, we 
consider it appropriate, under Rule 51, to 
examine the legal issues presented. 
Plaintiff's first claim as error on appeal is that the 
court should have allowed a cause of action based upon Utah Code 
Annotated 34-37-16(2). This Court has determined that pursuant 
to the plain language of the Code Section, no such cause of 
action exists and affirmed the court below. 
Plaintiff's second assignment of error concerned the 
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendant 
Western States Polygraph and Fashion Centre. This Court in 
Section III of the opinion determined that Plaintiff had 
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released the Defendants voluntarily from any claim for negligence 
as pled in her Complaint. 
Finally, Plaintiff presented as an assignment of error 
the court's refusal to allow the jury to evaluate Plaintiff's 
case based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. This cause of action, although supported by two of the 
Justices, was not supported by the majority of this Court and 
therefore does not survive appeal. On its own motion, this 
Court then, unilaterally, determined that Plaintiff is entitled 
to a new trial on the sole issue of whether or not the 
Defendants breached an implied term of the employment contract. 
This theory is not a new theory under Utah law and even 
though the court below tried to direct Plaintiff's counsel to 
pursue actively and directly this theory, Plaintiff's counsel 
elected to continue its quest for creating new law within the 
state of Utah. This Court, as long ago a thirty years, has 
recognized that a cause of action may exist "if she were 
discharged without just cause depending upon the terms of the 
contract, either expressed or implied...." Held v. American 
Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah.2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 211 (1957). The 
general rule was in existence and acknowledged by Plaintiff at 
the time that this case went to trial. In the case of Bihlmaier 
v. Carlson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979), this Court stated: 
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The general rule concerning personal 
employment contracts is, in the absence of 
some further expressed or implied stipulation 
as to the duration of the employment or a 
good consideration in addition to services 
contracted to be rendered, the contract is no 
more than an indefinite general hiring which 
is terminable at the will of either party. 
Bihlmaier, P. 791. 
In other words, at the time of the trial of this 
matter, there was no confusion as to the law on the theory of 
breach of an implied term of the employment contract. Since 
this theory has been in existence for quite sometime and since 
Plaintiff knew that this was the issue that would go to the jury, 
(See, Page 28 and 29 of Appellant's brief), it seems unfair that 
Plaintiff should not be required to preserve the matter for 
appeal by making appropriate objections and presenting 
appropriate jury instructions, and also that she should not be 
required to raise the matter on appeal after the appropriate 
preservation in the Court below. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 
(Utah 1987); E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency Inc. v. W.C. Foy & 
Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). Plaintiff has not raised 
this theory on appeal because she has conceded the issue. 
Appellant's Brief, p.27. 
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POINT III 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE WITH RESPECT 
TO THE THEORY OF BREACH OF THE IMPLIED TERM OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT, AS THE ISSUE HAS 
BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND DECIDED 
IN FAVOR OF FASHION CENTRE 
Justice Zimmerman repeatedly states that the facts of 
this case should be construed in the light most favorable to 
Berube. It is true that in considering the three grounds which 
Plaintiff presented for review, this Court should construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to Berube. The three grounds 
presented on appeal concerned rulings made by the court below 
with respect to alleged causes of action that were not viable 
within the state of Utah. This Court has affirmed the trial 
court's decision to deny all three areas. With respect to the 
theory upon which this Court wishes to remand, this Court should 
construe the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 
665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, Plaintiff has admitted at pages 28 and 
29 of her brief that the only theory that went to the jury was 
"whether the expressed provisions of the written policy of 
procedures became a limitation on the employer's ability to 
terminate Plaintiff." The jury after hearing all of the facts 
that Plaintiff wished to present on that issue and after 
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reviewing all of the jury instructions that the Plaintiff wished 
to submit on that issue, and after hearing the Plaintiff's 
argument on that issue, determined that there was no cause of 
action under the facts. Even though Plaintiff has not raised 
this as grounds for appeal, this Court has determined that a new 
trial should be granted on this ground. To do so, this Court 
must view the facts in the light must favorable to the jury 
verdict. In the matter of the Estate of Alice Kesler, deceased. 
First Interstate Bank of Utah v. David 0. Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 
(Utah 1985). If this Court were to review the record and the 
facts presented in this case, including the fact that Plaintiff 
has conceded that she was an at-will employee (R.449), that 
Plaintiff knew she would be terminated for refusing to take the 
third polygraph test (R.80, R.714), that Fashion Centre was of 
the understanding that she had failed the first polygraph test 
(Ex 12 P. R.905-907), that Fashion Centre was informed that Ms. 
Berube had falsified company documents pursuant to her admissions 
during the second polygraph test (R.927), that Shirley Berube 
herself felt that she had no expectation of continued employment 
(Appellant's Brief), this Court could easily determine that there 
was substantial evidence on the record to support the jury's 
finding dismissing Plaintiff's cause of action. This Court has 
correctly stated that: 
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An implied-in-fact promise cannot, of 
course, contradict a written contract 
term.... Nevertheless, the determination of 
whether sufficient indicia of an implied-in-
fact promise exists is a question of fact for 
the jury, with the burden of proof residing 
upon the plaintiff-employee. 
Slip opinion, Page 16. 
In this particular case, the jury found that the 
Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proof and therefore 
dismissed her Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submitted an appeal based upon three grounds. 
All three grounds have been denied by this Court. The Court has 
determined unilaterally that Plaintiff should be entitled to a 
new trial based upon the theory of breach of implied-in-fact term 
of the employment contract. This would require a new jury to 
determine whether or not the parties intended for the 
arrangement to be at-will or whether there was an express or 
implied limitation on the at-will doctrine. Since the Plaintiff 
has conceded that she was an employee at-will and has further 
acknowledged that she knew she would be terminated by refusing to 
take the third polygraph test, it would be inappropriate to allow 
a new trial on that issue. 
Fashion Centre hereby respectfully requests the Court 
to rehear this case pursuant to the issues presented above and 
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determine that the case in Its present posture, with the record 
as mi l present. 1 y H X I il .i . fiiHKei v eel a i i i pr esei ited • :)i 1 appeal by-
Plaintiff should not be remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd_ day of April , 
1989. 
HANSON', EPPERSON & SMITH 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Fashion Centre I I 
dba Fashion Gal of Ogden 
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